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1. Introduction 
Imagine three friends, Lucy, Maggie, and Sam, are walking along the beach and they see a bunch of 
driftwood wash up in front of them which is coincidently shaped like C A T. They have the following 
exchange: 
 Lucy: “Oh look, it spells ‘cat’!” 
 
 Maggie: “We just saw it wash up. It doesn’t spell anything, it just happens to look like 
 ‘cat’. If it’s a word it has to have been written by someone. That’s just a bunch of 
 driftwood that washed up in the surf.” 
 
 Lucy: “Of course it spells ‘cat’, just look at it, that’s exactly how ‘cat’ is spelled: c-a-t.” 
 
 Sam: “Hey Lucy, how do you know it isn’t a misspelling of ‘act’ and the ocean just made 
 a typo?” 
 
 Lucy: “Don’t be stupid, the ocean can’t make a spelling mistake.” 
 
 Maggie: “Yeah, but words can be misspelled so either that’s not a word or it could be a 
 misspelling of  ‘act’.” 
 
 Sam, getting tired of the exchange, suggests they go for mimosas. 
This exchange raises the following puzzle: is the washed-up driftwood a word-token of ‘cat’, a 
misspelled token of ‘act’ or does it fail to be a word-token at all? Call this the Individuation Problem: what 
determines which type a token instantiates? The literature on words has tended to focus on 
individuating types, rather than tokens, so while the Individuation Problem is raised in the literature on 
the metaphysics of words, it is typically set aside.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 E.g. Wetzel (2009, 105-6), Hawthorne and Lepore (2011). Kaplan (1990) is an exception and offers an explicit answer to 
the Individuation Problem. 
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 The problem arises because of three intuitive commitments which are jointly inconsistent. 
First, as expressed by Lucy, is the idea that for something to be a token of some type, it only needs to 
have certain intrinsic features relevant to the type. Second is Maggie’s denial of Lucy’s claim: for 
something to be a token of a type requires it to be produced in the right sort of way. Third, as expressed 
by Sam, is the idea that something can be a malformed token of some type. Call these the intrinsic condition, 
etiological condition, and norm types, respectively: 
(1)   Intrinsic Condition: The only individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on 
 something’s being a token of a given type is that it have certain intrinsic properties 
 constitutive of the type. 
 
(2)  Etiological Condition: A necessary condition on something’s being a token of at least some types 
is that it must be produced or come into existence in the right sort of way. 
 
(3)  Norm Types: Some types admit of properly and improperly formed tokens. 
Each of (1)-(3) has some intuitive appeal, but the conjunction of (1) and (2) are obviously inconsistent. 
Assuming types exist – as many philosophers do – does the driftwood arrangement spell ‘cat’? Some 
philosophers say no, since they think that the arrangement of driftwood didn’t come about in the right 
way since it wasn’t intentionally produced, thus adopting the etiological condition – Maggie’s intuition. 
It might seem that an obvious solution to the driftwood puzzle is to reject (1) in favour of (2), and 
indeed, this is the general consensus in the literature on words.2 Despite the prima facie appeal of (1) 
– just look at it, it looks just like the word ‘cat’ – brief reflection on the variety of word tokens militates 
against it. Words can be inscriptions, utterances, or raised bumps (Braille), so it looks like there are no 
intrinsic features of these tokens that they all share.3 
 Despite the general consensus in the word literature, some philosophers reject (2) in favour of 
(1). In the context of defending a platonist account of musical works as abstract types, Julian Dodd 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See e.g. Putnam (1981), Simons (1982), Kaplan (1990), Katz (2000), Hawthorne and Lepore (2011), and Irmak (2018). 
3 Stebbing (1935) defends the orthographic or shape view of words, while Simons (1982) argues against it. From these 
considerations, Wetzel (2002, 2009) argues that what unites tokens as tokens of a given type is simply that they’re all tokens 
of that types. 
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(2007, 34-5) and Nicholas Wolterstorff (1980, 86-7) adopt (1) over (2). However, they extend this view 
of musical works to types generally, including words, species, flags, elements, and artifacts. They 
thereby take the driftwood to be a genuine token of ‘cat’ since it has all the intrinsic features needed 
to be a token of that type, thus endorsing the intrinsic condition – Lucy’s intuition.4 However, Dodd 
and Wolterstorff also defend (3), taking some types to be norm types – types that can have properly and 
improperly formed tokens (Sam’s intuition). This includes musical works, words, flags, and species 
types. But the combination of (1) and (3) raises the issue brought out by Sam and Maggie in the 
dialogue: is the driftwood a proper spelling of ‘cat’ or an improper spelling of ‘act’? (1) suggests the 
former, but (3) allows for the possibility of the latter.5 
 My main claim is that the combination of (1) and (3) lead to some rather unintuitive and 
undesirable consequences which can be brought out in cases like the driftwood puzzle. In order to 
avoid these consequences, Dodd and Wolterstorff need to abandon either (1) or (3), and I’ll argue 
that, following the consensus in the literature on the metaphysics of words, rejecting (1) is preferable 
to rejecting (3). Thus, the aesthetics literature can learn a lesson from the literature on the metaphysics 
of words.6  
 The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I discuss Dodd’s and Wolterstorff’s 
commitment to the combination of (1) and (3). In section 3 I argue that such a commitment leads to 
implausible and unintuitive consequences and that neither biting the bullet nor one strategy that 
Wolterstorff could pursue would ultimately be plausible responses. In section 4 I consider which of 
the two commitments – the intrinsic condition or norm types – should be rejected in order to avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Wetzel (2009, 60-70) for criticism of both Maggie’s and Lucy’s intuitions. 
5 As far as I’m aware, no one in the literature has appreciated the difficulty the combination of these theses leads to. 
6 The aesthetics literature is far from being in agreement with Dodd and Wolterstorff on this point. Eaton (1969) argued 
early on in favour of (2) over (1), albeit in the context of poetry rather than music. In fact, Dodd and Wolterstorff seem 
to be in the minority here; the etiological condition is far more widespread than the intrinsic condition. As I’ll argue, the 
driftwood puzzle adds further support for (2). 
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these consequences and argue that on balance, (3) norm types, should be retained over (1) intrinsic 
types, before concluding in section 5. 
 
2. Dodd and Wolterstorff on Types 
Both Dodd and Wolterstorff defend a platonist account of musical works whereby a work of music 
is an abstract type of sound sequence event. Their views are largely similar.7 Musical works are abstract, 
and thus lack a spatial location, in order to explain their repeatability.8 They are also eternal (they exist 
at all times) and modally and temporally inflexible (their intrinsic properties don’t change across time 
or under counterfactual scenarios).9 
 Abstract types are unstructured, but have what Dodd and Wolterstorff call a property-associate 
which determines the conditions a token of the type must meet in order to be a token of that type. 
Types are individuated by the intrinsic properties that their tokens must bear to be tokens of that type, 
not how those properties come to be instantiated. Examples of such intrinsic properties are having an 
A minor chord at the start of the first movement, having a token of the letter-type ‘t’ followed by a 
token of the letter-type ‘h’ and followed by a token of the letter-type ‘e’ (for the word-type ‘the’), being 
made of a rectangular piece of cloth with certain dimensions, coloured red, blue, and white in this 
particular way (for the flag-type The Union Jack), and so on (Dodd 2007, 83). No extrinsic properties, 
such as a particular etiology, are required.10 Further, both Dodd and Wolterstorff accept a plenitude 
of abstract types: for any metaphysically possible combination of properties, there is a property-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 One principal difference is that Dodd (2007, 11-15) takes abstracta to be causally efficacious, while Wolterstorff (1970, 
171-172) does not. Dodd’s view is controversial, but see Friedell (2019) for a recent defense and see Juvshik (2018, 2020) 
for recent support of the more orthodox view that Wolterstorff takes. 
8 For Dodd, abstracta are only distinguished by their lack of spatial location where normally they are taken to lack both a 
spatial and temporal location. See Christmann (2019) for a recent defense of this view. 
9 Wolterstorff (1980, 89-90), Dodd (2007, ch. 2). 
10 Although, as Hugly and Sayward (1981) argue, physical objects aren’t intrinsically tokens, but are only tokens relative to 
a type, language or system. However, Dodd (2007, 77-78) argues that while work tokens must be relative to a type, they 
need not be relative to a language and thus we can have a word type without a language, though a word type might later 
enter into a new language in virtue of new patterns of use by speakers. 
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associate of some type corresponding to those properties. That’s just to say that every possible type 
exists.11 
 However, some types can have proper or improper tokens. Wolterstorff (1980, 56-57) 
introduces the notion of a norm type (or norm kind) to accommodate the seeming fact that say, works 
of music can be performed improperly or that word types can be spelt incorrectly, but still be tokens 
of their respective types.12 The general idea is that certain features are normative within a type, so that 
to be a properly formed token a token must have all of the normative features. By contrast, an 
improperly formed token is missing some of the normative features of the type.13 Some performances 
of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony are improper tokens insofar as they have some wrong notes. As long 
as a performance isn’t missing too many of the features normative within the work, then the 
performance is a genuine, albeit improper, token of the type (Dodd 2007, 32-33). 
 Dodd and Wolterstorff are thus committed to both of the following: 
(1)   Intrinsic Condition: The only individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on 
something’s being a token of a given type is that it have certain intrinsic properties 
constitutive of the type. 
 
(3) Norm Types: Some types admit of properly and improperly formed tokens. 
Dodd and Wolterstorff take the arrangement of driftwood to be a genuine token of ‘cat’, since it 
satisfies the intrinsic condition. But they must say that the arrangement of driftwood is also a bad token 
of ‘act’, given their commitment to norm types. (1) and (3) seem to yield conflicting judgements about 
which type the driftwood arrangement is a token of, so Dodd and Wolterstorff are faced with the 
Individuation Problem. Is the arrangement of driftwood a properly formed token of ‘cat’ or an improperly 
formed token of ‘act’? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Wolterstorff (1980, 46ff.), Dodd (2007, 60ff.). 
12 Dodd and Wolterstorff both use ‘type’ and ‘kind’ interchangeably (Dodd 2007, 32n19; Wolterstorff 1980, 194). 
13 Kaplan (1990) and Wetzel (2009, 60 and n.5) also recognize the normativity of certain types, especially word-types. 
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 It may be thought that the driftwood puzzle, being about words, doesn’t apply to the views of 
Dodd and Wolterstorff since they’re concerned with musical works. However, a similar case to the 
driftwood can be constructed for musical works; indeed, both Dodd and Wolterstorff offer such a 
scenario. Wolterstorff argues that “an occurrence of ‘Greensleeves’ might be brought about by the 
wind whistling through the rocks of Bryce Canyon; and as a corollary, a person might hear 
‘Greensleeves’ without the occurrence that he hears being produced by performing or playing.” (1980, 
86). Similarly, Dodd writes that 
Suppose, by some gigantic fluke, a sound-sequence were produced naturally (perhaps by 
the wind rattling through an empty house) that was recognizable as a note-for-note 
facsimile of the sounds indicated by Marsalis’ score for In This House, On This Morning. 
Would not this also count as an instance of the work? To my mind, there is no harm in 
treating such a pattern of sounds as a genuine token of In This House, On This Morning. 
(2007, 34) 
 
Thus, on their view, musical works can be tokened before they are composed because the abstract 
type exists at all times and composition is just creative discovery of the type. That is, they reject (2), 
the etiological condition.14 Such patterns of sounds are thereby tokens of the respective musical types. 
Moreover, given their commitment to norm types, a naturally occurring sound sequence that was note-
for-note similar to In This House, On This Morning but had several wrong notes would count as an 
improper performance of the work. 
 Both Dodd and Wolterstorff are clear that their views generalize from musical works to other 
kinds of types. Dodd (2007, 33ff., 50-53, 77-86) frequently uses word-types as examples and argues 
that “types surely form a unified ontological category” so that what applies to word-types applies to 
all types (2007, 53). Dodd takes his view to apply to types as diverse as the Tango (2007, 49), species 
like the Polar Bear and Daffodil, flags such as the Union Jack (ibid., 38), cars such as the Ford 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See especially Dodd (2007, 112ff.) for a defense of composition as creative discovery. 
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Thunderbird as well as other artifact kinds like the Jet Engine (ibid., 68-69),15 and other repeatable 
artworks as such as films (ibid., 15-16). Similarly, Wolterstorff (1980, 46ff.) argues that repeatable 
entities (types/kinds) exist so long as there’s a property-associate determining the conditions that their 
tokens must meet.16 This applies as much to words and other repeatable entities as it does to music 
(1970, 235-236). As a result, Dodd and Wolterstorff face the driftwood puzzle (or the wind puzzle, if 
you prefer, but I’ll focus on the former).17 
 Given a commitment to both Norm Types and Intrinsic Types, how do we solve the Individuation 
Problem? In the case of misspelled words that are intentionally produced we have an easy answer: 
they’re tokens of the word-type that their author or utterer intended to produce so long as they don’t 
lack too many of the features normative within the type. If I intend to write ‘cat’ but write ‘catt’ instead, 
this seems like an improper token of the type ‘cat’, but if I instead write ‘koahtt’ this doesn’t seem to 
be a token of ‘cat’, improper or otherwise. Those who, like Dodd and Wolterstorff, adopt the view 
that tokens of norm types need not be intention-dependent find themselves in a difficult position: 
which types are such tokens types of? Next, I’ll show how answering ‘both’ leads to unintuitive and 
implausible consequences. 
 
3. Consequences of Norm Types and the Intrinsic Condition 
Dodd and Wolterstorff need an answer to the driftwood puzzle. The conjunction of the intrinsic 
condition and norm types entails that the driftwood arrangement is both a proper token of ‘cat’ and 
an improper token of ‘act’. But couldn’t Dodd and Wolterstorff simply bite the bullet and say that any 
given token can be a token of multiple, distinct types? In fact, when introducing the naturally occurring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The example of the Ford Thunderbird is originally Levinson’s (1980, 81), also introduced in the context of a theory of 
music. 
16 For Dodd as well, this just follows from their commitment to a plenitude of types and their forming a unified ontological 
category. 
17 Since word tokens can be utterances, we can construct a similar wind puzzle but with word tokens. All the same 
considerations apply; the case of words and works of music are parallel. 
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token of ‘Greensleeves’, Wolterstorff seems to accept this view: “it is possible for two distinct works 
to share some of their examples. Indeed, it is possible for them to share all their examples. This is so 
because a sound-sequence occurrence which has enough of the properties required for a correct (or 
indeed incorrect) occurrence of work W might also have enough to be an occurrence of a distinct 
work W*” (1980, 87).18 While Dodd doesn’t seem to discuss this issue, it seems a simple way to deal 
with the driftwood puzzle. 
 However, I don’t think Wolterstorff appreciates the consequences of this view. Given the 
plenitude of abstract types that Dodd and Wolterstorff accept, this response entails that there’s a vast 
number of word-types tokened by a single arrangement of driftwood. The arrangement of driftwood 
is a token of ‘cat’ and an improper token of not just ‘act’ but any relevantly similar word-type like ‘hat’, 
as well as words of other languages or words that have not yet been introduced into a language. 
Similarly, a correct token-performance of Moonlight Sonata is also an improper token of multiple other 
works, all of which we hear when we hear the single performance. Granted, because Dodd adopts the 
view that at some point the departure from the intrinsic structure of the type results in a failed token 
rather than an improper token, he’s able to place some limits on how many types any single token can 
be a token of.19 However, there’s still a counterintuitively large number of candidate types that are 
similar enough to one another for any given token to instantiate. 
 But this strikes me as absurd. When we hear a musical work performed we generally take 
ourselves to be hearing a single work. Imagine a case like Wolterstorff imagines, where a performance 
of one work W is done so poorly that the orchestra played something sonically similar to some other 
work W*. We wouldn’t tell the conductor that despite attempting to conduct W, she actually 
conducted W*. The same applies to word-types: I hear or read a good ‘cat’ not a bad ‘act’, let alone a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Wetzel (2009, 59) also entertains this idea. 
19 Dodd (2007, 32-33). 
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bad ‘hat’, ‘pat’, ‘sat’, ‘mat’, ‘fat’, ‘tat’, ‘bat’, or whatever else. The absurdity is perhaps most acute in the 
case of flag-types. It entails that a properly formed Belgian flag is simultaneously an improperly formed 
German flag in virtue of the stripes being vertical rather than horizontal and slightly out of order. Or 
consider a properly formed Polish flag: it has two horizontal stripes, the bottom red and the top white. 
This is also an improperly formed Indonesian flag, proper tokens of which have a red stripe on top 
and a white stripe on the bottom. These examples can be easily multiplied.20 I do not experience a bad 
Indonesian flag every time I see a good Polish flag. To bite the bullet here is to radically depart from 
our practices surrounding various kinds of types. With words, music, and flags we don’t experience 
(read, hear, see) a plethora of distinct types by interacting with a single token. Accepting that tokens 
can instantiate multiple types is just to deny that there is a tension between norm types and the intrinsic 
condition, but it doesn’t seem like a plausible way of avoiding the difficulty. 
 In order to avoid this counterintuitive result, Dodd and Wolterstorff could amend the intrinsic 
condition such that there is an etiological condition but only on improper tokens. They could claim that 
anything that has all the normative features within a type is a proper token of that type but to be an 
improper token of some type requires that there be a failed intention to produce a correct token of 
that type. The arrangement of driftwood is only a properly formed token of ‘cat’ not an improperly 
formed token of ‘act’. If I write ‘catt’ then this is an improperly formed token of ‘cat’ but only because 
I intended to inscribe ‘cat’ and failed. If Dodd and Wolterstorff were to go this route, I take the appeal 
to intentions to be necessary, since it’s otherwise not clear what would constrain the improper tokens. 
 This response seems ad hoc. It makes the conditions for being a token of a type disjunctive – 
if the token is intentionally produced, then the intention can fail and if the token was non-intentionally 
produced then it can only be properly formed – and only to avoid the Individuation Problem. If Dodd 
and Wolterstorff think that tokens of music- or word-types don’t need to be the product of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 E.g. the Andorran, Romanian, and Chadian flags; the flags of Italy, Ireland, Bulgaria, and Hungary, etc. 
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intention to produce a token of that type, then this arbitrarily constrains their view simply to account 
for improper tokens. 
 Further, this doesn’t fully avoid the problem, since it leaves room for a given token to be a 
proper token of multiple types. If the driftwood arrangement spelt ‘read’, then on this view it’d still be 
a token of multiple word-types, not only of English but any possible language. If I’m in a spelling bee 
and I’m asked to spell a certain word that’s homonymous such as ‘red’ and ‘read’, then that token 
utterance is in fact a proper token utterance of both ‘red’ and ‘read’, which are sonically 
indistinguishable. But it’s hard to see why we then allow participants to request the word be used in a 
sentence in order to disambiguate the word-type – there’s a fact of the matter as to whether the token 
utterance is of ‘red’ or ‘read’ and the speaker’s intention determines which. The participant would be 
making a mistake if they spelt ‘read’ but the utterer was uttering ‘red’. The participant wouldn’t get the 
correct answer by arguing that the token was ambiguous so their answer should be accepted. Platonist 
views like theirs don’t sit easily with such ‘default’ views, since it seems arbitrary that a single mind-
independent, eternal type is tokened ‘by default’ over its peers and moreover, it doesn’t avoid having 
to postulate tokens of multiple types. Besides being ad hoc, a view like this isn’t going to win any spelling 
bees.21 
 
4. What to Give Up? 
Given the unappealing consequences of accepting that tokens simultaneously instantiate multiple 
types, Dodd and Wolterstorff should abandon one of the two commitments which jointly lead to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Wolterstorff (1980, 86-87) comes close to adopting this view since he acknowledges two distinct kinds of musical work, 
the A and B senses. These correspond to the etiological condition and the intrinsic condition, respectively. However, both 
senses of musical work are norm types, so on the B sense the driftwood puzzle is a problem. Acknowledging a second 
kind of musical work doesn’t avoid this. Wolterstorff thinks both senses are present in our musical practices but admits 
that the A sense is more intuitive, but he conditionalizes (1980, 88) his view on the future possibility that some 
considerations be found that decide univocally in favour of either A or B. 
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driftwood puzzle, norm types and the intrinsic condition. But which to give up? I’ll consider each in 
turn, but on balance things clearly support retaining norm types over the intrinsic condition. 
 Dodd and Wolterstorff could give up norm types. Tokens of a type are individuated by the 
intrinsic properties that determine the type and how those properties came to be instantiated is 
irrelevant. The arrangement of driftwood is a token of ‘cat’, however, types are no longer normative: 
there aren’t any improper tokens of a type, just proper ones. Similarly, there are just tokens and non-
tokens of musical works; any improper performance, no matter how small the deviation from the 
score, fails to instantiate the type. 
 A similar view is held by Nelson Goodman (1976) with respect to musical works as a response 
to his infamous ‘wrong-note’ paradox. Goodman thought that if we allow that a musical performance 
that plays a wrong note can still be an improper performance of a work, then one can construct a 
series of cases such that a performance of Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star is actually an improper 
performance of Moonlight Sonata. Goodman thought this was absurd, so took any deviation from the 
score to be a failed token of the work.22 On such a view there are only tokens and non-tokens.23 My 
inscription of ‘catt’ isn’t an improper token of ‘cat’ – it isn’t even a word.24 
 This response vitiates the intuitive difference between a misspelt word or misplayed piece of 
music and a failed word or performance. Again, ‘catt’ is a misspelt attempt at ‘cat’ but ‘koahtt’ isn’t a 
word at all. Such a view can’t accommodate the phenomena of misspellings or musical works with 
slightly wrong notes or flags that don’t match the exact specifications, such as an American flag with 
only 49 stars. Yet these are clearly distinctions that we want to retain – our practices surrounding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Although Goodman was a well-known nominalist, so wouldn’t have had any truck with types. 
23 Note that Dodd (2007, 32-3) avoids Goodman’s paradox by embracing vagueness between an improper token and a 
failed token. For Dodd, an improper token is missing a few features normative within the type and at some point the 
number of missing normative features is so great that the performance isn’t an improper but a failed token. 
24 Moreover, an utterance of ‘red’ is simultaneously an utterance of ‘read’ since the token satisfies the intrinsic condition 
for both types. Thus, rejecting norm types leads back to tokens of multiple types. 
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words, music, flags, and other types clearly point to their being good and bad instances. Indeed, it’s 
absurd to think that if I hear a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth but with one wrong note, then I 
have failed to hear an instance of the work, but just a string of sounds that happens to be pretty close. 
Similar absurdities arise for other types: minor spelling mistakes frequently don’t hinder our ability to 
identify the word the author was intending to inscribe. A misspelt word, so long as it isn’t too 
misspelled, is clearly a token of the type.25 Norm types are an important subkind of type and should 
only be rejected in the face of overwhelming theoretical pressure. This is not the case, so Dodd and 
Wolterstorff should retain norm types. 
 Instead, Dodd and Wolterstorff could reject the intrinsic condition on tokens. This strikes me 
as the best option since it allows us to retain the intuitive distinction between improper and failed 
tokens. Indeed, I think intuitions strongly suggest that the arrangement of driftwood on the beach 
isn’t a word at all, just a highly improbable look-a-like. While I do feel some of the pull of Lucy’s intuition, 
the etiological condition seems far more intuitive. Happening upon such a scene, one would naturally 
assume that the driftwood was intentionally arranged that way and thereby assume that someone was 
trying to write something. But if one later found out that it was just a freak result of the surf, then the 
driftwood wouldn’t be viewed as a word at all. 
 This kind of reaction is familiar to many: you think you hear your name but it was just the 
wind whistling through a door that’s partially ajar. One would be inclined to reason as follows: ‘I 
thought I heard my name, but it was just the wind. I should shut the door’. Word-tokens are used to 
communicate, but absent their intentional production, they can’t communicate anything – they lack 
meaning. One could appropriate the driftwood arrangements and use them to communicate, but as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 A similar issue arises with malapropisms – we understand the author’s meaning even though they tokened the wrong 
word.  See Davidson (1986) for discussion of malapropisms. 
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Marcia Eaton (1969) argues in a similar case, they wouldn’t be word-tokens until they are so 
appropriated.26 
 In the case of musical works, the intuition is the same: a random assortment of notes that 
results from the wind whistling through a forest doesn’t produce a performance of Moonlight Sonata, 
just an eerily similar sound-sequence. It’s more difficult to imagine, but in some cases one could try 
to appropriate such a sound-sequence as a musical work. Until some agent does so it’s just a 
remarkably similar sound-sequence, not a token of Moonlight Sonata. 
 Part of what’s motivating the intuition to deny the intrinsic condition is that musical works, 
words, and flags seem to be artifacts, that is, they are the result of an intention to make one of those kinds 
of things.27 Dodd and Wolterstorff are denying this by taking the type to be mind-independent – the 
type is eternal and unchanging, so a musical work can be tokened before it’s ever composed and a 
word can be tokened before it enters into a language. Their commitment to the intrinsic condition is 
a denial that all tokens of the type need to be artifacts. Performances and playings of a musical work 
are certainly artifacts in virtue of being intention-dependent, but it isn’t necessary that tokens of such 
types be artifacts. The case of the driftwood and the wind whistling through the trees are putative 
instances of non-artifactual tokens of a word and musical work, respectively. 
 It’s these intuitions that drive the plausibility of (2) – the etiological condition – and on balance 
(2) seems far more plausible than (1) as a condition on tokens. In the above cases, tokens all need to 
be intentionally produced to count as a token of a word-type, musical work, or flag or other artifact 
types. But the problems with the intrinsic condition aren’t limited to the greater plausibility of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Eaton uses this to support the claim that a monkey hammering away on a typewriter wouldn’t produce a poem, but the 
resulting string of letters can become a poem if someone intentionally presented it as such. We seem able to appropriate 
things for such uses as when I move a piece of driftwood from the beach to an art gallery and ‘make’ a sculpture or into 
my kitchen so as to ‘make’ a wine rack. 
27 As Irmak (2018) has recently argued in the case of words. For general accounts of artifacts along these lines see Hilpinen 
(1992), Bloom (1996), Thomasson (2003), and Evnine (2016). Evnine explicitly extends the account to languages. 
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etiological condition; there are independent problems with it as a condition on work tokens especially. 
Words can be inscription or utterances. I can write ‘cat’ or say ‘cat’ and both are tokens of the type. 
Further, the word-type can be tokened in other languages using completely different alphabets or 
pronunciations. The orthographic or structural account of words looks radically implausible.28 As 
Hawthorne and Lepore write, “First, we wish to emphasize that we quite agree with Kaplan that a 
philosophically satisfying theory of words cannot proceed within a shape- or form-theoretic 
framework. Simple reflection on the fact that the same word can be written, uttered, signed, Brailled, 
or semaphored already renders such a conception dubious: after all, there is hardly anything shape- or 
form-like in common among an utterance, an inscription, a hand gesture, and a bump on a panel” 
(2011, 451). But other than orthography or structure, it’s hard to see what intrinsic properties all tokens 
of a word-type could share.29 While structural accounts are more plausible for works of music or flags, 
it doesn’t appear to generalize to all types. Musical works often seem to be individuated by their sonic 
structure, just as novels may individuated by their arrangement of words, but even this is highly 
contentious in the aesthetics literature. Indeed, many authors think historical context or 
instrumentation are necessary for a proper token of a musical work.30 Moreover, assuming tokens of 
musical works are individuated by their sonic structure and can occur naturally, John Cage’s infamous 
4’33’’ – a work where the orchestra sits in silence for four minutes and thirty-three seconds – would 
be instantiated anywhere there’s an absence of sound for that length of time.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Stebbing (1935) for an early version of this view. 
29 More plausible candidates like meaning are extrinsic and seem to rely on intentional production. Wetzel (2002, 2009) 
thinks all such accounts fail and argues that what all tokens have in common is merely that they’re tokens of that type, 
which is also an extrinsic property. 
30 E.g. Levinson (1980). In the case of literature, Borges’ Don Quixote is intended to show that historical properties are 
relevant in individuating works since otherwise identical sequences of words can have different aesthetic properties. Dodd, 
of course rejects this (2007, chapters 8 and 9). 
31 Although Dodd (2018) would push back here since he’s recently argued that, while 4’33’’ is individuated by silence 
(rather than environmental sounds), it isn’t a work of music, but a piece of performance art in the genre of conceptual art. 
However, if performance art is repeatable, as 4’33’’ seems to be, then Dodd’s type-account would presumably apply to 
such cases as well. 
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 The intrinsic condition has more plausibility as a condition on non-artifacts such as species- 
or mineral-types. Dodd and Wolterstorff take the Polar Bear and Gold to be species- and mineral-
types, respectively. However, gold clearly isn’t a norm type: there can’t be any improper tokens of 
Gold, something is either gold or it isn’t and this is determined entirely by its atomic structure. Dodd 
and Wolterstorff take species kinds like the Polar Bear to be norm types.32 Dodd (2007, 33) claims 
that a three-legged polar bear or an albino raven are genuine but improper tokens of their respective 
species-types. Such a claim raises legitimate concerns about ableism,33 but even if we grant Dodd that 
species-types are norm types, a three-legged polar bear seems importantly different from an 
improperly performed musical work or a misspelt word. Since polar bears aren’t artifacts, it’s more 
plausible that their tokens need not have any extrinsic condition on their existence. Nonetheless, 
species-types are often individuated extrinsically by their evolutionary origin. Thus, for something to be 
a polar bear, it must have ancestors of a certain sort. On Dodd and Wolterstorff’s view, an animal in 
a remote galaxy that is indistinguishable from a polar bear on Earth is a polar bear, since the token’s 
etiology is irrelevant. Most biologists and many philosophers wouldn’t take this to be a polar bear but 
an animal of a remarkably similar species.34 
 Despite Dodd’s claim that “types surely form a unified ontological category” (2007, 53) there 
seem to be important differences between kinds of types. Dodd himself already admits that some 
types are norm types and some aren’t. This fact alone shows that their properties don’t fully generalize. 
While the intrinsic condition looks plausible for chemical types like gold and maybe species types like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Wetzel (2009, 70, 119-120) also takes species kinds to be norm types. 
33 In what sense is a three-legged polar bear an ‘improper’ polar bear? Disabilities such as congenital deafness are now 
usually taken to be ‘abnormal’ only relative to whatever is normal in the population. Thus, a three-legged polar bear is only 
an improper polar bear because most other polar bear tokens have four legs. This seems importantly different from why 
a performance with a wrong note is an improper performance, since the normativity comes from, perhaps, the composer 
or the nature of the type. 
34 Although there are two distinct conceptions of species, the causal-historical conception that individuates species by 
evolutionary origin, and an intrinsic conception that individuates species by relations between organs ultimately governed 
by DNA. Dodd and Wolterstorff could adopt the intrinsic account to alleviate the implausibility. 
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the Domestic Dog,35 it looks implausible for works of music, flags, cars, and the tango, and it looks 
downright absurd in the case of words. In these latter artifactual cases, the etiological condition seems 
appropriate and it may also be necessary for species types. Perhaps in some cases, such as musical 
works, the etiological condition and the intrinsic condition are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for being a token of a given music-type but we need to be aware of and responsive to, the 
vast differences between types. 
 Rejecting the intrinsic condition, at least as a sufficient condition on tokens, therefore seems like 
the best way to handle the driftwood puzzle.36 Most if not all norm types seem to require some kind 
of extrinsic or etiological condition on their tokens. Tokens of norm types must have certain features 
normative within the type to be a properly formed token of that type, but they also need to be produced 
in the right way. With such an etiological constraint, we can see why the Belgian flag isn’t a bad German 
flag, why spelling ‘red’ as ‘read’ commits a mistake, and how we can distinguish between an improper 
and a failed musical performance. The above considerations provide reasons for our intuitive 
judgements in the driftwood case. Maggie was right in the dialogue above: the driftwood is neither a 
good token of ‘cat’ nor a bad token of ‘act’, it isn’t a word-token at all. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The driftwood puzzle shows the unpalatable consequences of adopting both (1) and (3) – the intrinsic 
condition and norm types. Since Dodd and Wolterstorff accept these two commitments, they need 
an answer to the driftwood puzzle. I’ve argued that they shouldn’t bite the bullet in this case, as 
remarks of Wolterstorff’s suggests he would be willing to do, because the consequences that result are 
so counterintuitive and implausible. Instead, I argued that Dodd and Wolterstorff should give up (1) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This is Dodd’s example, but domesticated animals are plausibly artifactual. See Sperber (2007). 
36 Kaplan (1990) rejects the intrinsic condition as neither necessary nor sufficient. For him, all that matters for something 
to be a token of a given word type is the intention behind it. See Hawthorne and Lepore (2011) for recent criticism of 
Kaplan’s view. 
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while retaining (3) since the existence of norm types seems so firmly rooted in our linguistic, musical, 
and other practices. By contrast, the appeal of the intrinsic condition largely rests on a small subset of 
types – chemical types – without readily generalizing to other types, despite Dodd’s claim that types 
form a unified ontological category. Therefore, Dodd and Wolterstorff would be well served in 
following what has long been the consensus in the literature on the metaphysics of words: the intrinsic 
condition is implausible as a condition on word tokens. This equally looks to be the case for musical 
works and other repeatable artworks such as literature and film. Adopting an etiological constraint on 
tokens is an eminently plausible way of avoiding these difficulties. 
 However, the implausibility of both the consequences of biting the bullet and rejecting norm 
types largely rests on running afoul of our practices. But such concerns are unlikely to sway Dodd, 
who holds a realist approach to metaphysics which takes theoretical concerns as paramount and our 
practices as revisable in the face of tensions between theory and practice (Dodd 2012).37 Thus, while 
I think Dodd and Wolterstorff should abandon their commitment to the intrinsic condition, given 
how fervently Dodd holds the view and his metaontological commitments, this is unlikely. As a result, 
Dodd (and Wolterstorff) will probably bite the bullet and accept the weird consequences that arise 
from the driftwood puzzle. While the consequences of their commitments are unattractive, they 
should be acknowledged. 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Patrick Grafton-Cardwell, Hilary Kornblith, Ned Markosian, Linda 
Wetzel, and the audience at UMass Amherst for helpful comments and criticisms. 
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